Dogdom: Nonhuman Others and the Othered Self in Kafka, Beckett and Auster by Anderton, Joseph
 1 
Dogdom: Nonhuman Others and the Othered Self 
in Kafka, Beckett and Auster 
Twentieth-Century Literature, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Duke University Press, September 
2016) pp. 271-288 
http://tcl.dukejournals.org/content/62/3/271.full 
 
This paper reflects on how Franz Kafka, Samuel Beckett, and, more recently, Paul 
Auster convey the fundamental ‘unknowability’ of animal perspectives in their 
respective prose works ‘Investigations of a Dog’ (1922), Molloy (1955) and Timbuktu 
(1999) whilst at the same time conveying the closeness, even liminality, that canines 
possess. I make the claim that, as with speaking in place of another, speaking for 
oneself also entails the production of an Other and that these various efforts to read 
and give voices to dogs underline the rupture of the self-reflective human subject. The 
failing attempts to read canines result in the successful writing of human ignorance of 
nonhuman animal worlds, but they also expose the fissure within human 
autobiography. 
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In an essay on Jacques Derrida’s animal philosophy, David Wood writes: 
‘Anthropocentricism, in some sense, is logically unavoidable, [...]. Any account we 
come up with of “our” relation to “animals” will be from “our” point of view’ (Wood 
19-20). The implication is that descriptions and depictions of non-human animals will 
always be rooted in the human perspective and therefore prioritise the human. Even in 
the most empathic literary explorations of the lives of animals, an inevitable 
gravitation to the human self will take place, as all words lead to home. It follows that 
this unavoidable anthropocentrism includes a kind of life writing, which is to say, 
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there is a human autobiographical gesture inscribed within writing on non-human 
animals, or, to extend on Wood’s pronouns, there is a human ‘I’ implicit in ‘our’ point 
of view. The human invariably attends reading and writing endeavours that are 
seemingly intent on being attentive to other things. Samuel Beckett, a writer 
renowned for his taciturnity regarding his own work, describes eloquently such 
reflexivity in a 1949 letter: ‘I who hardly ever talk about myself talk about little else’ 
(Beckett, Letters 2 141). Similarly, as writers attempt to represent non-human animals 
or take imaginative leaps to speak for them, these efforts are bound to be deficient or 
inadequate, not least owing to the lurking presence of anthropomorphism in the use of 
human language. In her introduction to the essay anthology Speaking for Animals: 
Animal Autobiographical Writing, Margo DeMello acknowledges the basic problem 
confronting writing on animals: ‘Because they don’t speak our language, and we 
don’t speak theirs, we cannot see, nor can we guess, what’s in their mind’ (DeMello 
5). Such boundaries between human and non-human animals indicate the inability to 
apprehend and relate animal experiences and their engagement with the world. The 
indecipherable world of animals reveals the limits of literary creativity and serves to 
expose the toiling human ventriloquist behind the animal dummy. 
 The radically secretive, unrepresentable animal, inhabiting what German 
biologist Jacob von Uexkull labels ‘unknown and invisible worlds’ is a familiar 
concept (Uexkull 41). Less familiar is the notion that literature’s incongruity with 
animal worlds at least implies a sense of efficacy when it comes to representing 
human life. As Karla Armbruster observes: ‘The notion that human language cannot 
capture the fullness of animal existence often carries the unstated assumption that it 
can capture humans’ experience of the world’ (Armbruster 26). Franz Kafka, Samuel 
Beckett and Paul Auster are sceptical of such assumptions and each resort to uncanny 
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dehumanised creatures in their writing to subvert the privileging of human language. 
In Kafka’s 1922 short story ‘Investigations of a Dog’, the dog episodes in Beckett’s 
1955 novel Molloy and Auster’s 1999 novella Timbuktu, the epistemological and 
expressive poverty in reading and writing animals also occurs within human 
autobiographical reflections proper. In this essay, I examine experimental prose that 
challenges humanist assumptions on the reliability of self-reflection to contend that 
autobiographical deeds are beset by inimical challenges comparable to those 
encountered in reading and writing animals. In this line of twentieth-century writers, 
which bear unconscious affinities and declared lineages, the disjunctions that arise 
between human and non-human animals also occur to an extent between self and 
writing. Indeed, I argue that, for Kafka, Beckett and Auster, writing the self can 
involve writing the other; in the same way that writing the other can involve writing 
the self.  
 Leigh Gilmore, for example, describes how ‘the self becomes oddly multiple 
just at the time one might think it was most organized and coherent - the moment of 
telling its own story’ (Gilmore 36). Such cases of heteroglossia are commonly 
attributed to testimonies of traumatic events, in which the distance between the actual 
experience and the expressed account is magnified.  Yet the blind spots and 
shortcomings of such attestations are also evident in more diffuse traumatic ruptures, 
such as the modernist tightrope walk between psychological reality and the material, 
everyday world; the Marxist narrative of the human’s severance from the natural 
world; and, on a more widespread linguistic level, the distance between speaker and 
the spoken. Beckett exemplifies this last fracture in his 1958 novel The Unnamable 
through the phrase ‘I say I’ (Beckett 293). The first pronoun ‘I’ appears to assert 
more authority here, as it points out the representational function of the second 
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uttered pronoun ‘I’. However, Beckett’s phrase intimates that the first pronoun is as 
equally suspect as the second, as a signifier floating away from its signified, which 
makes the autobiographical ‘I’ a self-othering expression. Derrida identifies this gap 
in his seminal lecture for the 1997 ‘The Autobiographical Animal’ conference: 
‘between this relation to the self (this Self, this ipseity) and the I of the “I think,” 
there is, it would seem, an abyss’ (Derrida 417). The distance between the real and 
the representation encourages explorations of others since it already pervades 
narratives of human self-reflection. Again, Derrida alludes to this note of non-
specific alterity as a basic feature of autobiography: ‘The I is anybody at all; [...] 
Whosoever says “I” or apprehends or poses him or herself as an “I” is a living animal’ 
(Derrida 417). Far from securing itself to the individual, the attempt to articulate the 
self bypasses the human and non-human animal distinction to betray only a general, 
anonymous valence. This formulation revises the common admission to the 
unknowability of animals and contends that human autobiography shares in the 
profound ignorance.  
 Dogs in particular evoke a complex range of alienations as liminal animals 
between the domesticated life of humans and the open wilderness of non-human 
animals. They are pets granted the title ‘man’s best friend’ that live in close proximity 
with humans and forge tight fellowships that ineluctably cause them to seep into 
human consciousness and creativity. In fact, such was the integration of dogs into 
human thought during the nineteenth and early twentieth century that they figured as 
annexes of human identity and, by proxy, deserved comparable rights. Susan McHugh 
identifies this shift in perception: ‘people not only started to accept the idea they 
owned dogs as property but, more importantly, envisioned even dogs in the street as 
representatives or extensions of themselves, if not beings entitled to protection from 
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state torture’ (McHugh 137). Despite this sentimentality, dogs carry derogatory 
associative meanings as emblems of menial labour, or ‘dog’s bodies’; as 
representatives of the failing, lower echelons of society, or ‘the underdogs’; and as 
visions of abject indigents leading the idiomatic ‘dog’s life’. The infamous ‘No Irish, 
No Blacks, No Dogs’ signs that appeared in London shop windows in the 1950s are a 
particularly potent example of the dog’s integration into human society, but they also 
illustrate its association with oppressed and ostracised people. The dog retains a 
negative symbolic value that haunts the image of the loyal and lovable pet so that, in 
effect, the dog is simultaneously companionable and contemptible.  
 The dog is a unique animal in human culture on the basis of its pervasive 
integration into domestic life and deployment as an analogic figure of social 
segregation. Owing to this curious mixture of inclusion and exclusion, Philip 
Armstrong proposes that the dog is ‘the animal that perhaps more than any other runs 
to and fro between the human and animal worlds, simultaneously marking and 
crossing the boundary between them’ (Armstrong 17). Given the pervasive presence 
of canines in the everyday lives of humans, our harmony with dogs appears 
undoubted and yet the familiarity of the pet can make its difference all the more 
palpable, and, according to Alice Kuzniar, more painful. Kuzniar writes: ‘The 
melancholic pet owner longs for complete rapport and to know that the dualisms 
between animal and human are untrue. Yet she is saddened by the inevitable 
disjointedness and nonsimultaneity between herself and the extimate species, 
extimacy being that which is exterior to one yet intimately proximate’ (Kuzniar 7-8). 
The dog’s relative closeness strengthens the human desire to fully comprehend it but 
also serves to underline the melancholy of the fundamental separation. It is a dynamic 
not unfamiliar to humans and emerges especially in autobiographical writing, wherein 
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one’s own life and human identity can seem oddly detached in the process of 
reflection and retelling. So, whereas Gertrude Stein raised the possibility of identity 
being affirmed in dogs, ‘I am I because my little dogs knows me’, the dog might also 
give a lesson in living with the simultaneously known and unknown, or, to put it 
otherwise, the self and the other within the human (Stein 111). For this very reason, 
Christina Gerhardt locates the suppressed animal in Theodor Adorno’s conception of 
‘the non-identity of identity’, whereby ‘each entity contains its opposite within itself 
and is thus constituted, by this tension of identity and non-identity’ (Gerhardt 165). If 
the ancient Greek maxim, ‘know thyself’ means knowing one’s limitations, knowing 
thyself might also include the impossibility of truly knowing thyself. Ironically, self-
knowledge is perhaps the great limitation worthy of acknowledgement, which at once 
reasserts and refutes the inevitable anthropocentric gravity of animal writing. 
 
‘Reflection without end’: (De)Anthropomorphism in Kafka’s ‘Investigations’  
In Franz Kafka’s diaries there is over a dozen references to dogs, most of which 
pertain to incidents that either amuse or disconcert him. Two entries in particular 
reveal how Kafka aligns himself with the prevalent view of the dog as a lowly, 
unclean being. In November 1913, Kafka expresses his doubts about writing and all 
but describes himself as a dog in the process: ‘At bottom I am an incapable, ignorant 
person who, if he had not been compelled - without any effort on his own part and 
scarcely aware of the compulsion - to go back to school, would be fit only to crouch 
in a kennel, to leap out when food is offered him, and to leap back when he has 
swallowed it’ (Kafka 237). Kafka’s self-disappointment causes him to find affinity 
with the dog as an image of a miserable, wretched creature, although his education 
continues to stand out as a redeeming feature. Just over a year later, on 7th February 
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1915, Kafka is at a ‘complete standstill’ with his writing and regards himself as 
‘execrable’ (Kafka 330). The next entry reveals that Kafka’s failure to write anything 
satisfactory is now in an effort to produce a ‘dog story’ focussing on the very 
creature to which he related previously when struggling to write. He remarks: ‘Wrote 
a little today and yesterday. Dog story. Just now read the beginning. It is ugly and 
gives me a headache. In spite of all its truth it is wicked, pedantic, mechanical, a fish 
barely breathing on the sandbank’ (Kafka 330). Kafka finds this dog story 
incongruous and ill fitting for its purpose, like a fish out of water. His use of the 
adjectives ‘wicked, pedantic, mechanical’ implies that his composition is a kind of 
perversion, as though he has produced a distortion of the natural. It is not certain to 
what Kafka’s 1915 dog story amounted but according to the unforgiving self-
criticism evident in his diaries, it is apparent that Kafka can perceive himself as a dog 
as a result of the dog tale he cannot write. 
 Early in 1922, in the lead up to writing ‘Investigations of a Dog’ in October 
and November, Kafka suffered a breakdown and experienced a bout of intense self-
analysis. Curiously, his diary entries are less frequent during this time and trail off 
especially after the summer. In one of the few entries later in the year he records a 
‘good period’, referring presumably to his health, morale or writing, or perhaps all 
three, and that he had ‘made a kind of discovery in the woods’ (Kafka 422). Kafka’s 
sustained period of introspection appears to coincide with a decreased interest in 
using his diaries as a site of life writing and a turn instead to autobiography in his 
fiction. Kafka spent time with his sister Ottla and walking the landlady’s dog, which 
he mentions in the diaries simply as ‘walk with the dog’, commenting on ‘an 
innocently attentive animal gaze’ (Kafka 422). As with his earlier affinity with dogs 
and their association with his repeated inability to write, Kafka’s proximity with the 
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animal during this period merges with his new impetus in autobiographical writing, 
causing Kafka to invest himself into a dog story. Eric Williams also suggests as 
much:  
 
 ‘Investigations of a Dog’ is the only story he wrote in which all the 
significant phases of the protagonist’s development, from early childhood and 
 pubescence to old age, are fashioned into a life-narrative. Indeed, a short time 
 before beginning this uniquely retrospective Bildungsnovella, Kafka had 
 resolved to remedy the torment that so frequently beset him when “writing 
 denied itself” to him, with a self-reconstruction project that would reverse the 
 tracks of his career: “Hence, [my] plan for autobiographical investigations,” 
 he writes. (Williams 100)  
 
The link between Kafka’s self-scrutiny and dogs supports autobiographical 
interpretations of his animal writing. Notwithstanding the temptation to read Kafka 
in the dog, it is notable that he is traversing the insurmountable gaps of ontological 
meaning in his story and therefore does not only draw on a kind of ignoble canine 
alter-ego to uncover his own ignorance and impotence but recognises the 
predicament as part of canine life also. Kafka embraces the undecipherable, the 
illegible and the unknowable that apply to human and non-human animal worlds, and 
allows them to guide his writing methods.  
 Kafka’s short story announces itself as a meditation by a dog for a canine 
audience. The narrator confesses to be detached from the canine community in the 
opening lines but nevertheless addresses a canine reader: ‘dogs like you and me’ 
(Kafka 281). The report itself contemplates the profound questions of canine 
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existence, particularly ‘what the canine race nourished itself upon’ (Kafka 286) and, 
without access to genuine scientific objectivity, the narrator surmises that the 
answers might lie in the community that escapes him. Kafka makes no effort to 
devise a canine aesthetic as such, preferring instead to couch his dog narrative in 
rationality and a register that is recognizably human, albeit one that is gradually 
degraded. The lack of differentiation between species on this front appears to court 
anthropomorphic and anthropocentric readings. Naama Harel lists several allegorical 
meanings (the number of which technically refutes the story’s allegorical status) 
including: Jewish identity, homosexual identity, the limit of human consciousness, 
the attempt to examine the human ability to establish its own existence, and relations 
between author, as an individual, and society (Harel 50-51). Indeed, this familiar 
gravitation to the human is an aesthetic snare that yields a convincing analysis 
suggesting Kafka’s dog imitates human anthropocentrism to expose the self-
absorption of all beings. In an essay included in Kafka’s Creatures, Margot Norris 
avers that ‘one effect of this story is to turn anthropocentricism inside out by 
parodying the world of species narcissism which allows humans to perceive creatures 
purely from their own cultural vantage’ (Norris 24). By the narrator’s own admission, 
he is fixated on his own kind: ‘all that I cared for was the race of dogs, that and 
nothing else’ (Kafka 289). The narrator virtually erases human intervention from his 
perception of feeding, training, transporting and hunting, which leads to strange 
images of these activities with the human absent. In an echo of humanist pride and 
‘man as the measure of all things’, Kafka’s narrator claims, ‘All knowledge, the 
totality of all questions and answers, is in the dog’ (Kafka 289-90). As a result of this 
kind of blind self-centeredness, the animal kingdom is disbanded, projecting an 
implied ‘humandom’, ‘dogdom’, ‘catdom’, ‘mousedom’ and so on, with each world 
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revolving around each sovereign species. By showing anthropocentrism back to the 
reader, or at least ‘species-centrism’, Kafka is at once censuring and partaking in 
anthropocentrism. He encourages the human parallel, prompting readers to 
acknowledge their complicity in this self-centredness, yet Kafka also broadens the 
scope to suggest that this narcissism is endemic to each species. 
 Kafka’s dog story conveys a universal fixation on homogeneity, which both 
unites and divides species: unites in the shared insular propensity, divides in the 
myopia towards others. The far-reaching complication of this gravitation towards the 
self and alienation from others is a basic lack of self-knowledge, both in the animal’s 
absence of sophisticated self-consciousness and the latency of the human’s 
interminable self-reflection. In Kafka’s ‘Investigations’, the product of this condition 
is a composite of the autobiographical reflections that Williams identifies and the 
anthropocentric readings that Harel lists, which together are themselves a projection 
of the profound estrangements from human and non-human animal neighbours, but 
also within human autobiography. On one level Kafka’s life experiences inject potent 
personal meanings into the story that in turn illustrate broader socio-political, cultural 
and religious resonances that can be situated in a geographical and historical context, 
as several critics have commented. Matthew Powell, for example, claims:  
 
What is clear in “Investigations of a Dog” is that Kafka is not only attempting 
to portray the obsessive introspection that dominated his life, but also the 
alienating other(ness) that defined his existence. This need to define the self 
— and consequently, this need to define other(ness) — was a chronic attempt 
to search for a reason or a cause for his position as other in European society. 
(Powell 137)  
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This is not a prescriptive meaning but rather one more valid effect of the story, and 
yet it does little to pacify the troubling suspicion that the dog merely betokens the 
human, which neglects the meaning of the animal qua animal. An allegorical reading 
is overly reductive if it continues to prioritise a single ulterior meaning over the 
surface meaning. With Kafka, it is prudent to approach allegory from the Benjaminian 
angle, whereby explicit and implicit meanings compete, generating an irresolvable 
friction and a cloudy sense of meaning. In this way, the integrity of both animal and 
human stories is maintained and their significances allowed to converse, overlap or 
made mutually applicable. Rather than only concentrating on marginalised identities, 
personal social alienation or even the human existential quest, Kafka effects a 
correspondence between the lack of canine self-knowledge, the lack of human self-
knowledge and indeed the impossibility of knowing other species.  
 Kafka’s ‘Investigations’ cultivates the human-animal common ground through 
an ambivalent double movement. In an obvious anthropomorphic move, the story 
performs a humanisation of the dog as it traces the narrator’s exploration of his own 
kind through human logic and language. Contrary to this animal-becoming-human 
dynamic, Kafka at the same time undermines human logic and language, conveying 
their inadequacies in the pursuit of knowledge, thus executing a dehumanising tactic, 
or rather, deposition of the human, in both senses of the word. Kafka’s dog tale 
exposes the fragile properties of the human, thus displacing a secure notion of human 
identity and thereby testifying to the mysteries of what it really means to be human, or 
a living creature for that matter. Tellingly, the complexity and scale of the subject 
matter overwhelms the quasi-scientific, reasoned investigation the narrator carries out. 
He despairs over the ‘superabundance of material’, lamenting how truth is ‘not only 
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beyond the comprehension of any single scholar, but of all our scholars collectively 
[...] it ever again crumbles away like a neglected ancestral inheritance and must 
laboriously be rehabilitated anew’ (Kafka 287). Confidence in the progress of 
education and devotion to rigorous academic disciplines are both in vain. Even 
science, seemingly a root to practical truth in the early 1920s, with confirmations of 
Einstein’s theory of relativity in 1920 and Einstein’s Noble Prize for Physics in 1921, 
adds ‘Mere details, mere details, and how uncertain they are’ (287). The canine 
narrator disputes the usefulness of such investigation: ‘Science rich in knowledge but 
poor in practical results’ (288). With his simultaneous application of and affront to 
human methods of gaining knowledge, Kafka anthropomorphises only to 
deanthropomorphise, if, that is, human identity rests on these privileged properties of 
self-reflection through language and logic. 
 Kafka makes it known that when the human conceit is removed, it is not the 
animal that remains but the bewildering enigma of all living creatures. Walter 
Benjamin’s phrase ‘reflection without end’ in his essay on Kafka for the tenth 
anniversary of the author’s death helps to describe this empty revelation in 
perpetually tracing the blank. Benjamin is particularly attentive to the physical 
nuances in human behaviour that Kafka dislocates from normative human 
significance. The German critic incisively comments that:  
 
It is possible to read Kafka’s animal stories for quite a while without realizing 
that they are not about human beings at all. When one encounters the name of 
the creature - monkey, dog, mole - one looks up in fright and realizes that one 
is already far away from the continent of man. He divests the human gesture 
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of its traditional supports and then has a subject for reflection without end. 
(Benjamin 118).  
 
Kafka dethrones the enlightened human to reveal the recesses, not to illuminate them, 
but to stare at the darkness of the mystifying human. In doing so, Kafka marks a point 
of convergence in living creatures’ inabilities to identify metaphysical truths about 
their own kinds and other beings. In this respect, humans and non-human animals are 
in the same predicament, despite the differences in characteristics and capacities. 
Indeed, when the dog narrator asks,  ‘How long will you be able to endure the fact 
that the world of dogs, as your researches make more and more evident, is pledged to 
silence and always will be’ (Kafka 292), it is clear that it applies to both human and 
non-human animals, that the same silence engulfs both. Each is an island to the other 
and to itself.  
The elusive human self has certainly not gone unnoticed in Kafka studies, with 
Peter Stine suggesting that, for Kafka, this self-alienation is a trait shared amongst 
humans: ‘his discovery that language might pursue the self but never reach it led him 
to envision this failure to reach the goal of self-knowledge as our common fate, and to 
posit an “indestructible” self permanently hidden from us as his only article of faith’ 
(Stine 58). If this human pursuit of self (and by implication, other) in language is like 
a dog chasing its tail, it is not a great leap to propose that we can perceive the actual 
dog as an object, and perhaps subject, of a similar ignorance. The self-reflection in 
language that fails to locate the human self, also fails to decipher the other, either 
human or non-human animal. Living creatures are riven from self and other, but, at an 
acute level, even without language, all are united in their alienation and lack of self or 
other knowledge, whether through self-reflection or autotelic immersion. For Kafka, 
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then, it seems the goal of human language is to evoke the shared silence that sits at the 
heart of literary anthrozoology and human self-reflection. As with the other writers 
discussed shortly, Kafka shows awareness of the instability of the distinctions 
between humans and animals, and the ambiguity of others in his story, besides 
marking difference, is also, oddly, a point of confluence that allows us to 
acknowledge and relate to the obscurities of non-human animals. This blindness is not 
merely an acceptance of human uniqueness and superiority. It is actually a point of 
relation, in our relative unknowing. 
 
Going To The Dogs: Human-Becoming-Animal in Beckett’s Molloy   
If, as Margot Norris asserts, Kafka ‘allows the fictional animal to speak itself through 
or as a deconstructed human’ (Norris 19), Beckett’s 1953 novel Molloy evokes the 
animal by way of a similarly ruined version of the human. Whereas Kafka’s dog tale 
must first humanise the dog though in order to then deanthropomorphise the animal, 
the eponymous Molloy is a human protagonist subject to what might be described as a 
process of ‘animalisation’, which does not reverse anthropomorphism as much as 
level the humanist vision of the human. Beckett’s quasi-detective novel of self-
discovery is divided into two parts, with the first part focussing on the increasingly 
decrepit Molloy as he sits in his mother’s room struggling to relate his recent and 
failed journey to find his mother. As far as Beckett’s limited story arc goes, Molloy’s 
search for his mother is the first indication of a regression to his origin; he is 
rewinding back to infanthood and the foetal attachment in the womb. Speaking of 
Beckett’s tendency to attenuate and negate, Shane Weller argues that Molloy’s 
mother quest signifies ‘a reversal of evolution, an unhumanization rather than a 
spiritualization’ (Weller 99). Whilst the magnetism of the womb has a compelling 
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psychoanalytical subtext, Weller shifts the emphasis away from Freudian undertones 
to accentuate what elsewhere Beckett calls the ‘loss of species’ (Beckett 82) that sees 
Molloy dislocated from the normative idea of humanity.  
Given that Molloy is one of Beckett’s first bold steps in his trilogy of novels 
also featuring Malone Dies and The Unnamable towards a ‘literature of the unword’ 
(Beckett 11), or ‘art of failure’ (Iser 1), this ‘unhumanization’ is most distinct in 
Beckett’s deliberately defective aesthetic, which dwells on the inadequacy of 
expression, the fallibility of narrative, the fragility of knowledge and the creativity of 
memory, each of which disrupt human capabilities and humanist assumptions. During 
Molloy's observation of the two rambling strangers A and C, for instance, his desire 
for clarity and susceptibility to doubt shred through his narrative: 
 
And once again I am I will not say alone, no, that’s not like me, but, how shall 
I say, I don’t know, restored to myself, no, I never left myself, free, yes, I 
don’t know what that means but it’s the word I mean to use, free to do what, to 
do nothing, to know, but what, the laws of the mind perhaps, of my mind 
(Beckett 13) 
 
Despite Molloy pronouncing a newfound freedom to know the laws of his mind, the 
fragmented irresolute style in which he arrives at this possibility renders the success 
of such an enterprise highly dubious. The idea that Molloy is capable of anything 
other than obliviously demonstrating the vacillations of his mind is a joke. Yet, 
ironically, Molloy is relatively lucid about his deficiencies and manages to recognise 
his inability to comprehend language:  
 
 16 
Yes, the words I heard, and heard distinctly, having quite a sensitive ear, were 
heard a first time, then a second, and often even a third, as pure sounds, free of 
all meaning, and this is probably one of the reasons why conversation was 
unspeakably painful to me. And the words I uttered myself, and which must 
nearly always have gone with an effort of the intelligence, were often to me as 
the buzzing of an insect. And this is perhaps one of the reasons I was so 
untalkative, I mean this trouble I had in understanding not only what others 
said to me, but also what I said to them. (Beckett 50) 
 
Molloy is set adrift from the community largely owing to this inability to effectively 
communicate with others. The capacity to codify the world and share it through signs 
is unavailable to Molloy. As such, language as a semiotic system dissolves into a 
purely sensory experience of the sounds, without the associated concepts. This is 
reinforced by the physical pain Molloy suffers when trying to converse; the abstract 
values assigned to language have been replaced by the corporal experience of 
phenomena and sensation. The upshot is that Molloy is distanced from the definition 
of the human as a rational, speaking animal, despite attempting both of these skills. 
More pressingly, however, is the fact that Molloy also receives the words he himself 
utters as peculiar murmuring sounds, comparable to those generated by an insect, an 
animal of the most alien variety. Unlike Gregor Samsa’s creaturely noises in Kafka’s 
Metamorphosis that are nonsense to his immediate family but sound articulate to him, 
Beckett’s Molloy actually perceives his own voice as other. Although the 
communicative drone and dance of Moran’s bees in part two of Molloy lends some 
vague semblance of meaning to Molloy’s murmur, it is evident that his language, a 
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defining feature of his humanity, is alien to him. Molloy’s communication breakdown 
not only separates him from other people, then, it separates him from himself.  
As Beckett’s trilogy of novels unfolds, the reduction of human properties is 
only exacerbated so that ‘[b]y the end of the trilogy Beckett hovers over the ruins of 
modernism, the exhaustion of a certain view of what it is to be human and rational’ 
(Miller 18). Nevertheless, Molloy is undeterred in his attempt at least to relate his 
own past and make sense of the events of his life. The problem is that as Molloy 
attempts to scrutinise himself, he inevitably adopts an outside vantage, dividing an 
already perplexing life into two and then reconstructing it through a doubly mystified 
lens. In this way, Molloy is practicing what the trilogy as a whole performs: the 
movement from ‘I’ to the fallibility of ‘I’ to the third person implied in every ‘I’. 
Beckett’s 1958 novel The Unnamable, the third text in the trilogy, claims to have 
abandoned ‘I’ altogether, precisely owing to its duplicity: ‘I shall not say I again, ever 
again, it’s too farcical’ (Beckett 358). In response to the inability to reconcile the 
pronoun with the self, Simon Critchley proposes that ‘the voice is attempting to move 
from the first person to the third person, from ‘I’ to ‘s/he/it’ (A Beckettian pun of 
questionable taste offer itself here, but I will resist)’ (Critchley 173). In Beckett’s 
hands, the conviction in ‘I’ as a complete identification with the whole self perishes 
and returns to the execrable condition of third person self-reflection, which evokes 
shades of Kafka in the damning scatological judgment. Beckett is aware that ‘the very 
act of trying to perceive oneself separates the self into subject and object’ (Barry 123), 
that ‘seeing is an asymmetric action’ and ‘listening to oneself is almost always 
already inherent in the act of speaking itself’ (124). In the tradition of self-rupture 
evident in the canine identity of Kafka’s ‘Investigations’, Beckett zooms in on the 
incipient point of self-expression to trace the extent of the fault lines.   
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Over the course of his stumbling story, Molloy is treated as an aberrant social 
outcast and in turn evokes the lowly dog trope. In an early essay on the presence of 
dogs in Molloy, Phillip Solomon writes: ‘In Molloy, human beings are condemned to 
lead a dog’s life and to die like a dog’ (Solomon 91). Beckett himself was in fact fond 
of dogs, particularly the Kerry Blue terriers his mother May owned at the family 
home in Foxrock, which were belligerent dogs according to Deidre Bair’s biography 
(Bair 12). In his letters during the 1950s, though, Beckett resorts to more negative 
conceptions of dogs, such as ‘Balzac lying like a dog, abandoned by all, with the 
smell of gangrene pervading the house’ (Beckett, Letters 248). Beckett recognises the 
precariousness of the dog life, particularly alluding to the rejection from the welfare 
of the community and the resulting poor physical condition. Furthermore, like Kafka, 
Beckett also calls upon the trope of dogdom to self-deprecate: ‘The dog is duller than 
ever but its friends know it doesn’t mind if they get up and go away’ (Beckett, Letters 
611). Beckett identifies himself as a dog in this letter to insinuate he is rather unfit for 
social life. These references continue in his fiction and the decisive dog episode in 
Beckett’s novel occurs when Molloy accidentally runs over and kills Miss Lousse’s 
dog Teddy with his bicycle. The aftermath is worth quoting in full:  
 
instead of grovelling in my turn, invoking my great age and infirmities, I made 
things worse by trying to run away. I was soon overtaken, by a bloodthirsty 
mob of both sexes and all ages, for I caught a glimpse of white beards and 
little almost angel faces, and they were preparing to tear me to pieces when the 
lady intervened. She said in effect, she told me so later on and I believed her, 
Leave this poor old man alone. He has killed Teddy, I grant you that, Teddy 
whom I loved like my own child, but it is not so serious as it seems, for as it 
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happens I was taking him to the veterinary surgeon, to have him put out of his 
misery. For Teddy was old, blind, deaf, crippled with rheumatism and 
perpetually incontinent, night and day, indoors and out of doors. I would as it 
were take the place of the dog I had killed, as it for her had taken the place of 
a child. (Beckett 32-33) 
 
The wise ‘white beards’ and innocent ‘angel faces’ readying to rip Molloy to bits 
anticipate the animalisation of the human evident in Molloy’s replacement of the dog. 
The mob’s transformation from a noble and pure idea of civilisation to ‘red in tooth 
and claw’ savagery reflects Molloy’s own deterioration from integrated citizen to 
primitive reptilian creature. It is ironic, then, that the animalised Molloy would be 
quite in keeping with the savage society that bays for his blood and later sees to his 
exclusion. A second note of irony is that ‘old, blind, deaf, crippled with rheumatism 
and perpetually incontinent’ describes Molloy’s own state at the end of the story as a 
confused, needy, decaying figure struggling to conduct his journey properly, in both 
physical and narrative senses. Molloy therefore replaces Teddy, becomes akin to the 
dog and exposes the hypocrisy of society in the process. 
Although Molloy is a first person narrative from a human perspective, it 
features the deconstruction of human properties seen in ‘Investigations of a Dog’, 
complete with the same unhinging of rhyme and reason. With human ascendancy in 
ruins, the human can act as a substitute for the animal; Molloy too can be a subjugated 
pet. The Irish myth of Setanta echoes here, as the man who slayed Culain’s guard dog 
in self-defence and took its place, earning the name Cuchulain, meaning ‘Hound of 
Culain’. To Beckett’s mind, the literary inspiration of the myth belongs to the 
‘antiquarianism’ of the Celtic Twilighters that he despised (Knowlson 188-89), but he 
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nevertheless retains the fascination with the porous borderlines between human and 
non-human animals. Indeed, as Weller expresses, with the creaturely Molloy ‘Beckett 
disintegrates the Cartesian human/animal distinction, producing neither a rational 
animal nor Aristotle’s political animal, but rather a human-becoming-animal that 
counterpoints Kafka’s animal-becoming human in his “A Report to an Academy” 
(1917)’ (Weller, Not Rightly Human 215). This Deleuzian ‘becoming’ unsettles the 
human-animal distinction to create a ‘zone of indiscernibility or undecidability 
between man and animal’ (Deleuze 21). What Weller does not mention, however, is 
that Teddy the dog was already a replacement for a child, which casts infants, animals 
and human indigents as interchangeable objects of care. The pet dog in lieu of a child 
affair is an example of the ‘anthropomorphic insolence’ that Beckett criticised 
covertly in his earlier novel Watt (202), but the pet human for pet dog exchange 
redresses the balance somewhat. This equivalence further compounds the 
vulnerability of a definite human-animal divide and enters both Molloy and Teddy 
into a hybrid, creaturely realm. Whether the transformation moves from human to 
animal or vice versa, the point is that a relation is forged that destabilises the binary.  
With the replaceability established, it is possible to view Molloy’s inability to 
master language and narrate his own story as a sign of the autobiographical silence 
shared by human and non-human animals. Moreover, it is not only that the dogman 
Molloy is an inadequate storyteller but that the human system of communication 
wholesale appears deficient. It is revealing, then, that Beckett jotted in his 
Whoroscope notebook Fritz Mauthner’s reflections on the limits of language, ‘noting 
our deluded sense, like a clever dog, that we are free simply because the chain is long’ 
(Ackerley 183). As humans and canines share likenesses in Molloy and are deemed 
transposable, Beckett promotes a more fluid continuity between beings that supports 
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the notion that the natures of self and other are beyond representation and essentially 
unknowable. 
 
‘A man with the heart of a dog’: Speaking in lieu in Auster’s Timbuktu   
Like Kafka and Beckett, Paul Auster evokes and complicates the ‘dog as miserable, 
wretched creature’ trope in his 1999 novella Timbuktu. His emphasis on language in 
the book and the narrative perspectives it generates repeat the logically inevitable 
anthropocentric gravitations whilst intimating the mutual blind spots that unite human 
and non-human animals. Auster’s 1987 The New York Trilogy presages his 
preoccupation with the search for identity and meaning in the world, albeit in 
exclusively human terms. As with Beckett’s loose evocation of crime fiction, Auster 
takes advantage of the genre’s quest for knowledge but repositions the magnifying 
glass over the searching individual and his engagements with others. Ostensibly, the 
detective novel thrusts the comprehending, organizing subject to the fore, as Ilana 
Shiloh notes: ‘its interest lies in the human endeavor to apprehend reality’ (Shiloh 36). 
In the first of the tales City of Glass Auster relates novelist-cum-detective Daniel 
Quinn’s surveillance of Peter Stillman and his subsequent unravelling as identity falls 
foul of multiple invented guises before the target of the case absorbs him. Quinn 
neglects to assimilate himself into the body of knowledge he so painstakingly 
accumulates through his figments, including Max Work, Paul Auster, Henry Dark and 
Peter Stillman Jnr., and he therefore becomes a victim of the ‘failure to create a 
meaningful connection between his inner self and the material world’ (Brown 37). In 
a genre that enacts the workings of the mind, powers of deduction and commitment to 
scrupulous observation, Auster considers the precarious meaning of the self in a world 
mediated by language and indistinguishable from fiction, ultimately asking the 
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question: ‘how do we locate ourselves in the world when language has failed us?’ 
(Brown 45). In Quinn’s rootless state, he can be connected to many identities in a way 
comparable to the polysemy of words. Stillman remarks that Quinn’s surname ‘flies 
off in so many directions at once’ (Auster 74) to the point where obscure rhymes are 
used to refer to him. The inclusion of ‘djinn’ in this list of referents aptly compares 
Quinn to the magical spirit from Arabian and Islamic mythology that can assume 
various human and non-human animal forms. Although Auster is firmly fixed on the 
fragility and mobility of human identity in this crime novel, his reference to the shape 
shifter in relation to Quinn is an early indication that self-other quandaries can stray 
into animal ipseity.    
 The second novel Ghosts follows private eye Blue as he observes his target 
Black. True to his name, though, Black is impenetrable and deflects his spectator’s 
gaze. The reader discovers that it is ‘as though Blue were looking into a mirror, and 
instead of merely watching another, he finds that he is also watching himself’ (Auster 
146). According to Shiloh, this means that ‘for lack of any external object of 
perception or locus of significance, [Blue] is bound to direct his look inward’ (60). 
His failed empirical observations result in self-scrutiny, which is also to no avail as 
his essence evades him. With his individual character non-existent, the tale grows into 
‘a parable of the human condition: blue and black are everyman, absent to himself and 
to others, locked in his private consciousness’ (67). Clearly, Auster is fascinated by 
the psychological immersion in the unknowable human other and the apertures in the 
human self that explorations into alterity uncover, although it is not until Timbuktu 
that Auster extrapolates to introduce an animal into the equation and thereby move 
from a human condition to the relationships between living creatures.   
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Timbuktu is about a dog called Mr. Bones and his homeless poet owner Willy 
G. Christmas as they endure the idiomatic ‘dog’s life’, impoverished on the fringes of 
society. Auster explicitly includes the cliché, writing: ‘Dog as metaphor, if you catch 
my drift, dog as emblem of the downtrodden, and you’re no trope, my bod, you’re as 
real as they come’ (Auster 57). The irony here is that the metaphor actually applies to 
Willy himself and, as a result of his vagrancy, the real dog Mr. Bones experiences the 
grim reality of the figure of speech. McHugh surmises that Mr. bones ‘shares the 
double economic burden of being socially valued as worthless and the immediate day-
to-day problems of desperate living’ (McHugh 159). Besides this emblematic 
connection, the man and the dog also intersect in several behavioural respects. Willy 
is a recovering drug addict prone to psychotic episodes and Mr. Bones remembers an 
especially dark occasion witnessing Willy ‘eating a bowl of his own excrement’ (17) 
and that generally ‘[h]e stank and drooled’ (28). The fact that Willy resembles a dog 
during his bouts of narcotic-fuelled madness recalls the early nineteenth-century 
vision of the psychiatric asylum as a menagerie, although Mr. Bones also feels 
kinship with Willy in more positive ways, perhaps owing to Willy’s shared itinerant 
lifestyle that makes him ‘a man with the heart of a dog’ (30). Even the phallic 
valences of Mr. Bones’ and Willy’s names binds them to libidinal desire, which is all 
the more convincing given that Mr. Bones next owner is called Dick. The 
convergence of man and dog in these ways differs from The New York Trilogy in 
which Auster explored the human other’s disruption of the unity of the human self, as 
Dennis Barone describes: ‘When a character loses self-identity it is as if that character 
has been overfed on the character of an other’ (Barone 16). In contrast, in Timbuktu, 
the repeated, adopted or simply shared behaviours of the dog do not destabilise 
identity as much as bring hitherto unknown facets of the self to the surface. The 
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human potential for animality is underlined later in the novel when Mr. Bones 
observes a child imitating a wild cat: ‘The boy might not have been a real tiger, but 
that didn’t mean he wasn’t dangerous. In his own little way, he was more of an animal 
than Mr. Bones was’ (127). This wild substrate is always on the edge of human 
civilisation, as Mr. Bones’ and Willy’s border crossings disclose.  
In conjunction with the themes of Auster’s earlier trilogy, the human-animal 
resemblances in Timbuktu indicate that there is not always an uncomplicated and 
indisputable separation of human and no-human animal identities. However, Auster 
himself claims the novel is less about plot and ‘a lot to do with language, which is 
basically Willy’s language and the way Mr. Bones interprets that language’ (Auster 
website). As each attempts to understand the other’s language, it is notable that 
meaning is comprehended but that an unbridgeable gulf remains, which leads to some 
frustration, especially for Mr. Bones. The narrator says that Mr. Bones’ ‘grasp of 
Ingloosh was as good as any other immigrant who had spent seven years on American 
soil. It was his second language, of course, and quite different from the one his 
mother had taught him’ (Auster 6). This portrait of Mr. Bones’ language acquisition 
likens him to a foreign person, treating the communication barrier as a cultural rather 
than fundamental difference. Willy repeats this humanising gesture as he decodes the 
animal’s body language: ‘It was like learning how to speak a new language, Willy 
found, like stumbling on to a long-lost tribe of primitive men and having to figure out 
their impenetrable mores and customs’ (37). Willy draws a line of continuity between 
human and animal, suggesting Mr. Bones’ language is a part of his own ancestry. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Bones dreams of being able to talk properly to his companion, of 
having the same language, which reasserts the distance between dog and human: ‘It 
feels like talking. It sounds like talking. But that doesn’t mean I’m really doing it’ 
 25 
(181). Despite their close relationship and similarities, then, the man and dog remain 
separated by their differences and encounter insurmountable barriers to 
comprehension.  
 As Auster weaves in the novel’s spiritual, metaphysical query referenced in 
the title ‘Timbuktu’, humans and animals are re-gathered in contemplating the 
afterlife in a remote place. As in the dog’s dreams, ‘in Timbuktu dogs would be able 
to speak man’s language and converse with him as an equal’ (50). This spirituality is 
another point of anthropomorphic creative license regarding the dog, yet their 
concern with material finitude is undoubtedly mutual. Auster develops a note of 
parity here between human and dog, not only in the attribution of a conscious 
spirituality to the animal, which is usually attributed to humans exclusively, but also 
in their profound ignorance on the subject of death. In the final analysis, both the 
man and the dog are denied transcendental knowledge and left with the vulnerability 
of corporal existence in a ‘dog eat dog world’. This is literally the case when Mr. 
Bones is offered food from a Chinese takeaway and ‘he couldn’t help wondering if 
he was eating a fellow dog. […] His appetite would always get the better of him’ 
(107). As with the language barriers that prevent utter comprehension, the pair share 
a lack of certain knowledge about the metaphysical, and this blindness to kingdom 
come accentuates the precarious physical survival and dispiriting isolation that 
human and non-human animals can suffer, especially homeless and stray beings.  
Auster highlights basic affinities and distinctions between humans and dogs, 
and this mixture of familiarity and discreteness presents challenges in devising a 
narrative mode that can accommodate it. Auster employs a third person narrative 
perspective and there is a sense of equality in the fact that the third person acts as a 
witness and filter for both human and canine characters. The narrator insists that ‘Mr. 
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Bones saw it happen with his own eyes’ (3), yet it is apparent that the reader is 
necessarily receiving a second hand account of the events; we see the human owner 
through the pet dog through the anthropomorphic narration. The narrator attempts to 
speak for both man and dog, to articulate lives and worlds that they could not have 
spoken themselves. Nevertheless, Auster does not always exercise omniscience and 
he flirts with alienation techniques early in the novel in an attempt to convey Mr. 
Bones’ benighted perspective: ‘as surely as the sun was a lamp in the clouds that 
went off and on every day (3-4). The veracity of the statement is clearly not in 
keeping with the narrator’s knowledge and, at this stage in the novel, Auster employs 
writing strategies that chase the authenticity of animal autobiography. The narrator is 
minded to defer authority to Mr. Bones: ‘Ignore his opinion if you will, but who else 
are you prepared to trust? After listening to these stories for the past seven years, had 
he not earned the right to be called the world’s leading authority on the subject?’ (15). 
However, in this appeal to the animal’s authority, the narrator exposes his own 
interfering hand in the tale, as interpreter and translator of the story, and therefore 
offers only a superficial claim to animal authenticity whilst actually revealing the 
inadequacy of the narrative strategy. This comes back to the human narrative voice, 
to that inevitable anthropocentric and autobiographical gesture discussed early in this 
essay, yet it is as a reflection that admits both human and canine subjects contain 
mysteries beyond human articulation. Auster’s varied, unsteady narrative texture 
appears to be a metatextual criticism of such writing strategies, pointing out the 
difficulties that plague attempts to speak for others, whilst betraying how this alterity 
will remain present when humans and animals are unable to speak for themselves as 
themselves – when speaking in lieu seems inevitable.  
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Conclusion: Dog’s Day 
In Kafka’s ‘Investigations of a Dog’, Beckett’s Molloy and Auster’s Timbuktu, the 
literary sensitivity not just to animals but living creatures in general is noticeable in 
the undoing of human language and reliable narrative strategies to reveal the silence 
that will attest to the unknowable. By drawing connections between humans and 
animals, in shared narcissism, equivalent statuses, corporal vulnerability, the crisis of 
representation and problems of apperception, these twentieth-century experimental 
prose writers move towards a mutual perspective, albeit one that takes a detour 
through anthropocentrism. The limits of language in Kafka’s, Beckett’s and Auster’s 
animal stories reveal the blindness to the world of animals that not only reminds us of 
the human behind it all, but also the human’s inability to account for itself, which is a 
point of kinship with the animal. This openness to obscurity is itself an important non-
totalising gesture that is deferential to difference as opposed to imperiously 
dominating. The supposition that literature could somehow inscribe the animal does 
an injustice to the complexity of the lives of animals. On the contrary, it is entirely 
plausible that humans enfold canines into their everyday lives and culture, including 
our artistic practices, to keep the unknown close and grow familiar with its enigma as 
an enigma that we also share. As discrete identities reveal such junctions, human and 
non-human animals appear continuous in substantial ways.  
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